. (2016). Modeling of reliability and performance assessment of a dissimilar redundancy actuation system with failure monitoring. Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, 29(3), 799-813. doi: 10.1016/ j.cja.2015.10.002 Modeling of reliability and performance assessment of a dissimilar redundancy actuation system with failure monitoring Abstract Actuation system is a vital system in an aircraft, providing the force necessary to move flight control surfaces. The system has a significant influence on the overall aircraft performance and its safety. In order to further increase already high reliability and safety, Airbus has implemented a dissimilar redundancy actuation system (DRAS) in its aircraft. The DRAS consists of a hydraulic actuation system (HAS) and an electro-hydrostatic actuation system (EHAS), in which the HAS utilizes a hydraulic source (HS) to move the control surface and the EHAS utilizes an electrical supply (ES) to provide the motion force. This paper focuses on the performance degradation processes and fault monitoring strategies of the DRAS, establishes its reliability model based on the generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN), and carries out a reliability assessment considering the fault monitoring coverage rate and the false alarm rate. The results indicate that the proposed reliability model of the DRAS, considering the fault monitoring, can express its fault logical relation and redundancy degradation process and identify potential safety hazards.
Modeling of reliability and performance assessment of a dissimilar redundancy actuation system with failure monitoring As one of the key subsystems in aircraft, the actuation system is mainly used to transmit and distribute secondary energy power and conduct actuations, accomplishing flight control and operation by fulfilling preset missions. If a failure has occurred in the system, a minor outcome could result in a failed mission, but a disastrous outcome can result in fatal plane crash. Therefore, the performance and reliability of the actuation system are of critical importance to aircraft safety, maneuverability, and flight quality. 1, 2 In order to improve the reliability and safety of an actuation system, the dissimilar redundancy technology has been widely adopted in modern aircraft design. 3, 4 Airbus 380 was the first aircraft to introduce a system with a combination of dissimilar hydraulic power/electronic power and hydraulic actuators/electro-hydrostatic actuators aiming to avoid severe outcomes resulting from common cause failures in the actuation system. 5 Although the dissimilar redundant technology has enhanced system mission reliability, it has also increased the overall complexity due to the multiple redundancy design. Shi et al. 6 analyzed a triplex-redundancy airborne hydraulic actuation system and found that the number of system states has increased nine times due to the applications of redundancy techniques. In addition to the normal operating and complete failure states, the system is loaded with a great number of performance degrading states. In other words, the redundancy design in the power and actuation system makes an aircraft experience significant redundancy and performance degradation processes. The redundancy degradation affects not only the general performance, but also the general availability of the system because there are very complicated transitions within the redundancy degradation and between normal and fault states. It is concluded from the analysis of redundancy system failure mechanisms that the degradation failure process is closely related to the system architecture, equipment Integral state space of DRAS with FMD P eup equivalent operational probability of HA P edn equivalent failure probability of HA k e equivalent failure rate of HA reliability parameters, and redundancy transition strategies. Therefore, in order to gain better understanding of the reliability advantages of the DRAS, it is essential to conduct comprehensive research on all possible system states and transition paths from normal state to complete failure state. Traditional reliability modeling methods, reliability block diagram (RBD) and fault tree analysis (FTA), construct logic relations between component reliability and system reliability in accordance with the system structural composition and function, but they fail to represent the dynamic redundancy degradation and state transitions of DRAS. In addition, NPhard problem occurs when we calculate the minimum cut set of a large fault tree, as presented by Nystrom et al. 7 Yang et al. 8 applied evidential networks (EN) approach to the problem of the reliability of a redundant servo actuation system. His approach could not describe existing states and dynamic transitioning while the system is working. Distefano 9 and Ranjbar et al. 10 presented the analytical method of system dynamic reliability, and employed the dynamic Markov model (DMM) to illustrate states and behavior of the system. The authors approach was based on two-state assumption (normal and failed), which is unable to demonstrate in detail the entire degradation process from full-up state to failure. As the number of system components linearly increase, the system's state space will experience exponential increase, which means that DMM has exponential complexity. 11 DRAS is a typical multi-state system (MSS) performing its task with degraded performance levels. Levitin 12 proposed the universal generating function (UGF) method for MSS reliability analysis. A comprehensive review of MSS reliability theory and its applications can be found in the work by Lisnianski and Levitin, 13 where different approaches for assessing MSS reliability are presented in detail. An extension of Boolean models to the multi-valued case, stochastic process and Monto-Carlo simulation are also highlighted by Liu and Huang.
14 However, these methods could not describe the performance of FMD, which is necessary in DRAS. Yao 3 proposed a dynamic fault tree analysis model (DFTA) of an airplane fly-by-wire system. The approach included the dynamic timing of system failures, but did not consider state transition paths of the system redundancy degradation.
Furthermore, to ensure proper functioning of DRAS, FMDs are included in DRAS. FMD monitors the system states in real time, and isolates and cuts out faulty units. Multiple factors, including detection precision, layout of sensors, selection of failure thresholds, and other external interferences, collectively affect the performance of FMD. The performance of FMD is commonly denoted by failure monitoring coverage probability and false alarm probability. In actual application with monitoring coverage rate limits, FMD are unable to 100% correctly detect and isolate DRAS, which may have significant impact on the system safety. In extreme cases, failing to detect a fatal fault (complete failure in a single channel, HAS or EHAS, in DRAS) may cause disastrous consequences. However, when false alarms occur in FMD, it does not necessarily mean that all alarms or transitions are responses to real systemic faults, but rather, perfect or comparatively sound devices may be mistakenly switched off, thus lowering the utilization of the DRAS and affecting the mission reliability of the system. As a result, FMD often becomes the weak link in the entire redundancy system design. 15 The advantages of GSPN resulted in development of a triplex-redundancy hydraulic actuation system. The related reliability model of three parallel hydraulic actuators revealed how failure detection rates affected system reliability on the basis of the redundancy architecture, according to Shi et al. 6 However, they did not discuss degradation of actuator performance, nor false alarms from FMD.
The DRAS, in general, experiences performance degrading processes and fault sequences, different redundancy monitoring transition strategies, and potential faults which have significant impact on the system reliability. Thus, there is a need to develop a method to model the reliability of DRAS with fault monitoring. The Markov process 10 , which is commonly applied for system reliability modeling, requires predefinition for all state transitions when it is used in analyzing performance degradation and fault dynamic sequence, which makes the problem difficult to solve. The problem of using the Markov process approach to DRAS with monitoring devices is even more difficult due to significant complexity of the system. For such a complex system, to pre-define accurately all potential states is virtually impossible and any minor change in the system structure would require significant effort to reconfigure the model. Additional difficulty is presented by the fact that the current reliability model cannot manifest potential safety hazards due to introduction of FMD. Therefore, it is important to propose a new model applicable to the reliability and safety analysis of DRAS. GSPN is a modeling and analysis tool for distributed systems, particularly suited to describe the order, concurrency, conflict, and synchronous relationship of the process or component in a system. Meanwhile, as a special directed network, Petri net can reflect state changes and provide intuitive development of a system by means of a graphic model. [16] [17] [18] [19] This paper firstly studies the state transitions in the light of the characteristics of DRAS. A reliability model is constructed and solved using GSPN, and then the weak link of the dissimilar redundant system is identified. The detection probability and false alarm probability are considered as FMD is calculated, and the system fault logical relation and redundancy degrading process are presented. Finally, the causes and probability of potential safety hazards are analyzed, and the methods for improvement of system safety are discussed.
Reliability modeling for the dissimilar redundancy actuation system
The architecture and block diagram of a DRAS is shown in Fig. 1 , where the power supply includes hydraulic power (HS) and electric power (ES), and its actuation system is composed of an HA and an EHA. Energy for the HA is supplied by a central hydraulic power unit, whereas the EHA has integrated electric power and local hydraulic units. The system represents a typical dissimilar redundancy architecture in terms of power supply and actuation system. 20, 21 As indicated in Fig. 1 , the HAS consists of central hydraulic power supply (HS) and a hydraulic actuator (HA) including a servo valve and a hydraulic cylinder. The EHAS consists of electric power (ES) and an electro-hydraulic actuator (EHA) including a piston pump and a hydraulic cylinder. An FMD is set up in each channel to guarantee safe and reliable operation, early fault detection, timely fault isolation, and rapid maintenance of system failures. Normally, the HAS works alone as a primary driver of control surfaces, while the EHAS serves as a backup to the HAS. The hydraulic cylinder of the EHA is in a back-up state with two hydraulic chambers connected. If the HAS breaks down and its failure is correctly detected, the failed HAS will be isolated and cut off, which will cause the EHAS to carry on the mission of actuating control surfaces. If the EHAS is to malfunction, the aircraft will have to substitute it with other control surface combinations to realize the flight control.
State transition analysis of the dissimilar redundancy system
Deriving from the DRAS working principle and its failure occurrence and development process, we use k HAS and k EHAS to represent the failure rate for the HAS and the EHAS, respectively, as well as l HAS and l EHAS as repair rates. P m and P fa represent the monitoring coverage probability and the false alarm probability of FMD. Then the main DRAS states can be defined as indicated in Table 1 .
Based on the above state definitions, DRAS state transition relations are illustrated by Fig. 2 . The figure represents a diagram of state transitions based on the Markov process. It depicts the system redundancy degradation and failure processes. In the DRAS, an FMD is required to detect the working states of HAS and EHAS, whereas in a single HAS or EHAS, an FMD is not required. Here, P m represents the monitoring coverage probability of FMD and P fa represents the false alarm probability of FMD.
DRAS states, in Fig. 2 , are divided into three groups. The first group, represented with solid circles, includes DRAS functional states (1, 2, 3, 11, 12, and 13). State 1, represented with two concentric solid circles, means that HAS operates and EHAS is in standby mode normally. States 2, 3, 11, 12, and 13 are DRAS redundancy degradation states and are represented with a single solid circle. The second group of states, represented with dashed line circles, includes DRAS complete failure states (4, 5, 6 , and 7). The third group of states, represented with triangles, includes DRAS potential hazardous states (8, 9, and 10). The probability on the edge between two nodes indicates the state transfer probability. As the states are clearly described in Table 1 , it is straightforward to understand the parameters, the failure rate k and the maintenance rate l of the components (HAS and EHAS), as well as the monitoring coverage probability P m and the false alarm probability P fa of FMD in DRAS.
If the failure detection threshold value set in FMD is too high, or if FMD is out of order, an actual HAS failure may not be detected correctly. As a result, DRAS will not be able to cut off the failed HAS and switch operation to EHAS. In this case, the control surface driven by DRAS will be out of control, and the aircraft will be in a hazard state. This particular failure of DRAS is described as a transition from state 1 to state 10, as shown in Fig. 2 . Alternately, if the failure of EHAS is not detected due to FMD's incomplete detection coverage of DRAS in state 3, the control surface driven by DRAS may also be out of control, and the aircraft will be in a hazard state. This failure process of DRAS is described as a transition Fig. 2 . Therefore, missed detection and false alarm of FMD can create potential safety problems to the aircraft, affecting aircraft safety and its reliability. Furthermore, when DRAS is in state 1, HAS may be wrongly cut off and switched to state 3 because of the false alarm of FMD or occasional intermittent interferences. At that instant, if the EHA also reports a false alarm, then the overall system will soon be regarded as in a fault state. Transitions 1-3-7/6 and 1-2-5 show that false alarms can cause DRAS to drop into failure sooner, reduce the system utilization, and have negative effect on mission-accomplishing reliability. Consequently, when establishing a reliability model for DRAS, the FMD performance factor is of vital importance to the accuracy of the model. The Markov model approach is unable to reveal the working states of internal components in HAS and EHAS. The multiple states and complicated models render the solution of the Markov model even more difficult. Furthermore, both HAS and EHAS are closed-loop control systems, the performance of which may downgrade with an increase in service time. 22 Therefore, the reliability model of HAS/EHAS cannot be simply described with two states (i.e., operational and failed). Failure of HAS/EHAS can be divided into two modes: direct failure mode (DFM) and gradual failure mode (GFM). DFM is a failure mode in which a failure once occurs will directly cause failure in HAS and/or EHAS. In the case of HAS, typical DFMs include short-circuiting and disconnect of servo valve coil, seizing of the servo valve spool or hydraulic cylinder, and fatigue failure of the piston rod. Alternately, in the case of EHAS, typical DFMs include motor winding short-circuiting and disconnect, and damage of core insulation. GFM is a progressive failure mode, where the development and occurrence of GFM happen over a period of time. This failure mode includes failures such as leakage caused by the wear of hydraulic cylinders, abrasion of servo valve spools, and parameter fluctuation of various system components. The Markov model which takes into account the failure features of HAS/EHAS becomes unwieldy, thus making finding the solution increasingly difficult, and thus GSPN is introduced. A continuous-time GSPN with finite position and timed transition is isomorphic to a one-dimensional continuous-time Markov chain. 23 To describe the fault-maintenance process of a complex system, the dynamic operation of an actual system is simulated by marked flow in a reliability model based on GSPN. Meanwhile, as a mathematical tool, GSPN is obtained by establishing state equation, algebraic equation and simulation, which simplifies the reliability modeling and solving process of a complex system.
GSPN depiction of DRAS
Generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) are generally defined as GSPN ¼ ðS; T; F; K; M; KÞ, under the condition that
24 S ¼ fs 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s m g is the set of repository, T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; ::::; t n g is the set of timed transition, and the elements in F are called arcs. K ¼ fk 1 ; k 2 ; . . . ; k l g is the capacity function set of repository S and W is the weight function which connects the timed transition and the arcs of repository. M 0 is the initial identification of a system. K ¼ fk 1 ; k 2 ; . . . ; k m g is the set of the average trigger rate of the timed transition, where the reciprocal of k is the average time delay of the timed transition. In the reliability analysis, k is represented for failure/maintenance rate distribution of a component.
domðFÞ ¼ fxj9y : ðx; yÞ 2 Fg and conðFÞ ¼ fxj9y : ðy; xÞ 2 Fg are the domains of definition and range, respectively.
Assumptions
Assumption 1: Both the failing and repairing times of each component in DRAS can be represented by the exponential distribution.
Assumption 2: HAS is the main actuation system to drive the rudder, while EHAS is the backup system. Once HAS fails, EHAS replaces HAS and drives the control surface. HAS will take over once it is repaired. Assumption 3: FMD is used to detect failures in both HAS and EHAS. The isolation and switching of redundancy configuration are executed once FMD detects the faults. FMD is assumed to have limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability in DRAS.
Definitions
Definition 1: The GSPN-based reliability models of HAS and EHAS are described as:
Definition 2: The GSPN-based model of the DRAS in an ideal situation without FMD is described as:
Definition 3: The integrated GSPN model of the DRAS with FMD is described as:
where GSPN FMD is:
Model description
In order to effectively describe the operational/failed status of components and subsystems, we define S HAS ¼ fHS up ; HS dn ; 
GSPN model of DRAS
(1) GSPN model analysis of HAS According to the fault behavior analysis of HA and EHA described in Section 2.1, HA is a position closed-loop control system where fault behaviors include both direct failure process and progressive failure process caused by the performance degradation of components. The resulting HA's GSPN model, based on performance degradation, is shown in Fig. 3 .
According to the GSPN model, in Fig. 3 , HA can function normally in the initial condition, i.e., #(HA up ) = 1. After a period of time t HA1 , HA may encounter DFM with a probability of Pðt HAi4 Þ, and then a token is transmitted directly from HA up to HA dn . The failure that HA may encounter could also be a GFM with a probability of Pðt HAi1 Þ, and then HA is considered to be in the light failure state (HA lf ). Here, Pðt HAi4 Þ þ Pðt HAi1 Þ ¼ 1. The transfer rate of the timed transition t HA1 is k 1 , and then Pðt HAi4 Þk 1 describes the failure rate of HA from a normal operating state to complete failure, while Pðt HAi1 Þk 1 describes the failure rate of HA from a normal operating state to a light failure state. As the operational time is increasing, HA may encounter further performance degradation until down (HA dn ), or after a light failure state (HA lf ), a middle failure state (HA mf ) token is directly transmitted to HA dn with a probability of Pðt HAi5 Þ or Pðt HAi6 Þ. Here, Pðt HAi5 Þ þ Pðt HAi2 Þ ¼ 1 and Pðt HAi6 Þ þ Pðt HAi3 Þ ¼ 1. temp iði ¼ 1; 2; 3Þ represent temporary states in GSPN modeling of the HA performance degradation process. The failed HA will be repaired after transition t HA5 where the transfer rate is l.
It can be seen from Fig. 3 that the GSPN model of the HA performance degradation process has five steady states: working normally, the light failure state, the middle failure state, the serious failure state, and complete failure. If we use numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 to represent the five states, then the continuoustime Markov chain (CTMC) model of HA, which is equivalent to the GSPN model, can be represented as shown in Fig. 4 . The probability of state transfer is shown on the edge between two nodes in Fig. 4 . Pðt HAit Þ represents the probability of an immediate timed transition, k i represents the failure rate of different degraded HA, and l represents the maintenance rate from a complete failure state to a functional state.
According to the CTMC model shown in Fig. 4 , the state transition equation is obtained as:
The initial condition is: 
The steady probabilities of these states of HA can be obtained as follows:
The HA can still fulfill its function in the all four states 0, 1, 2, and 3, so the equivalent operational probability of HA (P eup ) and the equivalent failure probability of HA (P edn ) are:
In order to facilitate the reliability analysis, the failure and repair process can be equivalent to a transition between an operational state and a failure state. The simplified GSPN model is shown in Fig. 5 .
According to the GSPN structure in Fig. 5 , the equivalent operational probability of HA is:
where l e ¼ l. Accordingly, the equivalent failure rate of HA is:
The parameters of the HA model, the values of failure rate k i ði ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4Þ, and the maintenance rate l, according to Li et al. 25 are provided in Table 2 . The probability of HA's immediate timed transition is assumed based on experience. The value of k e can then be calculated from Eqs. (9)- (11) as
Combined with the failure process of HS, the dynamic GSPN model of the HAS can be established as shown in Fig. 6 .
As indicated in Fig. 6 , the hydraulic actuator (HA) and the hydraulic power supply (HS) can operate normally in the initial condition, #(HA eup ) = 1, #(HS up ) = 1, and #(HAS up ) = 1. When the timed transition t HAS1 is triggered, the operating state of HS is changed from a normal working state to a failure state, and the triggering rate depends on the failure rate k HS . Transition t HAS2 simulates the restoration process of HS, Fig. 6 indicates that three reachable states of HAS can be obtained as shown in Table 3 .
According to the states description of HAS in Table 3 , the CTMC model equivalent to HAS's GSPN model is shown in Fig. 7 . In Fig. 7 , states 0, 1, and 2 of HAS are described as in Table 3 . The probability of state transferring is shown on the edge between two states. The sum of probability of one state transferring to another state or remaining in its state is 1. In Fig. 7 , k represents the failure rate and l stands for the maintenance rate.
Based on the CTMC model of the HAS, the state transition equation is obtained as: 
where P i ðtÞ is the probability of state i. The initial condition is:
The result for HAS's reliability can be obtained accordingly. The steady state availability of HAS is:
Given the transition rate values in Eq. (15),
À4 =h, and l HA ¼ l e ¼ 6:8 Â 10 À4 =h. 25 The steady state availability is determined to be 0.6545.
The EHAS serves as the back-up system for HAS. If EHAS malfunctions and is subsequently repaired, the state of EHAS will be transferred from the fault state to the back-up state. That is, there will be three states for EHAS in the DRAS model: working, fault, and back-up. The GSPN model which describes the dynamic failure process of EHAS is similar to the HAS model, and will be shown in DRAS modeling.
(2) GSPN reliability model for the ideal DRAS without FMD
The working mechanism of DRAS is cold backup. In the beginning, HAS is working, and EHAS is in the back-up To correctly clarify the relations between component failure, subsystem failure, and overall DRAS failure, we can set up a reliability model for an ideal condition with no failure monitoring devices, as shown in Fig. 9 .
Since the model is very complex compared to the GSPN model of HAS, computer simulation is adopted to solve the problem. Model parameters for EHAS are given in Table 4 . When we operate the model in Fig. 9 and 86 states can be accessed, 9 of which have effective tokens, as shown in Table 5 .
In Table 5 , M 0 indicates that all components in both HAS and EHAS are in proper service. States M 1 and M 3 represent a failure in HAS due to an HS or HA fault, but all components in EHAS work well, so DRAS runs normally. States M 2 , M 4 , M 6 , and M 7 indicate that some have failed in both the HAS and EHAS, thus leading to overall system failure. States M 5 and M 8 indicate that HAS is in service, while EHAS is in the repair state due to ES or EHA failure, and the system is still operating.
It can be concluded from the above description that states M 0 , M 1 , M 3 , M 5 , and M 8 denote the normal operating state of DRAS, so availability of the system is described as:
In comparison with the availability of a single HAS in Section 2.2.4 (1), the adoption of the dissimilar redundancy working mode (EHAS) can highly improve the availability of the DRAS.
(3) Comprehensive GSPN model taking FMD's monitoring coverage probability and false alarm probability into account in DRAS In the ideal model in Fig. 9 , when HAS fails and EHAS is in the back-up state, the system will immediately switch to EHAS to drive the control surface; if the EHAS also breaks down, and the fault in HAS is not fixed, the DRAS will be considered to be in the failure status. In an actual DRAS, the HAS channel requires a fault monitoring device to check whether failure occurs and then makes transition when failure is detected. In the same way, EHAS also needs to be equipped with a monitoring device to detect and determine whether the system fails and then takes possible remedial actions. Affected by factors related to the system complexity and FMD reliability, the devices have certain indicators such as monitoring coverage probability and false alarm probability. If failure cannot be accurately detected, then potential failure and hazard states may result. Therefore, to better describe actual situations, a GSPN dynamic reliability model considering FMD performance is developed and presented in this paper. The system is shown in Fig. 10 .
In the model in Fig. 10 , instantaneous transitions t HASi5 , t EHASi5 , t HASi4 , and t EHASi4 , containing probability, represent the failure monitoring coverage probability and the fault missed detection probability of FMD, and 
Various system states can be seen from the GSPN model of an actual DRAS considering FMD performance When HAS fails, i.e., #(HAS dn ) = 1, the failure can be detected by FMD with a probability of P ðt HASi5 Þ, and then #(HAS fd ) = 1, #(HAS vdn ) = 1; therefore, DRAS switches to EHAS. Alternately, if the failure is not detected with a probability of P ðt HASi4 Þ, then #(HAS ud ) = 1, #(HAS vup ) = 1, and DRAS mistakenly regards HAS as functioning normally, without switching, so the DRAS is in danger. When HAS fails, i.e., #(HAS dn ) = 1\#(HAS fd ) = 1\# (HAS vdn ) = 1\#(EHAS bp ) = 1, then EHAS is activated. As time passes by, if EHAS fails, that is, #(EHAS dn ) = 1, the failure is detected at a probability of P EHASi5 , and then #(EHAS fd ) = 1, #(EHAS vdn ) = 1, and #(DRAS dn ) = 1, so the control surface driven by this DRAS is invalidated, and the flight control system will take measures for isolation and remediation. Alternately, if the EHAS failure is not detected at a probability of P EHASi4 , then #(EHAS ud ) = 1 and #(EHAS vup ) = 1, so the DRAS is running at risk. During EHAS failure, if HAS is fixed, then DRAS switches back to HAS. When false alarms have not occurred in HAS, #(HAS nfa ) = 1, #(HAS vup ) = 1, and #(DRAS up ) = 1.
If a false alarm occurs in HAS, then #(HAS fa ) = 1, # (HAS vdn ) = 1, and #(DRAS dn ) = 1, so DRAS identifies a failure by wrong determination, thus reducing availability. Similarly, when false alarms happen while EHAS is running, then #(EHAS vdn ) = 1 and #(DRAS dn ) = 1.
Assuming that the monitoring coverage probabilities of FMD in HAS and EHAS are Pðt HASi5 Þ ¼ Pðt EHASi5 Þ ¼ 0:9 and that the fault alarm probabilities of FMD in HAS and EHAS are Pðt HASi7 Þ ¼ Pðt EHASi7 Þ ¼ 0:05, we have 496 accessible tokens, 36 of which have valid states, as shown in Table 6 .
Analysis of DRAS accessible states provided in Table 6 reveals the following:
State M 0 indicates that HAS is in the normal service and is correctly detected, EHAS is in the proper backup standby mode, and DRAS is functioning well, which is the desired/ideal system state. States M 8 and M 13 indicate that HAS is in the normal service and is correctly detected, but EHAS fails, with failure being detected and repaired (ES or EHA failure respectively), and at this moment, DRAS is functioning, but with degraded redundancy. To combine the above six scenarios and nine states, the functioning probability (P A ) of DRAS can be worked out, which represents the DRAS availability. 
Further analysis of DRAS accessible states provided in Table 6 reveals the following:
States M 6 , M 7 , M 9 , and M 12 indicate that HAS is in malfunction and is detected, and DRAS transits to EHAS, which is in failure and is detected, so DRAS is in the normal failure state. States M 24 and M 28 indicate that HAS is in malfunction and is detected, and DRAS switches to EHAS when it is working properly but reports false alarms, so DRAS is in the normal failure state. States M 5 and M 10 indicate that HAS is functioning well but its false alarm makes it blocked, and DRAS activates EHAS that fails and is detected, so DRAS breaks down. State M 34 indicates that HAS is normal but it reports false alarms and gets isolated, so DRAS selects EHAS which functions well but reports false alarm, so DRAS fails.
In all of the above-mentioned four scenarios and nine states, DRAS cannot operate normally, and gives alarms. Therefore, the system failure probability, also known as unavailability (P UA ), can be determined as follows
i ¼ 5; 6; 7; 9; 10; 12; 24; 28; 34
Further analysis of DRAS accessible states provided in Table 6 To summarize, the incidence rate of hazard states (P D ) is: The above results are consistent with the analysis in Section 2.1. A comparison provided in Table 7 indicates that the introduction of FMD may leave the system in danger. In addition, the system reliability with FMD's monitoring coverage probability and false alarm probability taken into account is lower than that in an ideal situation (without FMD). The analytical results correspond to system behaviors observed in practice. 6 
Analysis of impact of FMD performance on DRAS reliability and safety
According to the reliability analysis models, the reliability outcome is often higher than the actual value because there is no consideration of impact of FMD performance on system reliability. However, if the performance of FMD is too poor, it will cause potential danger to the system by drastically lowering the system reliability. Hence, the effects of FMD performance on system reliability need to be studied. Fig. 11 Relationship between the working state probability and the monitoring coverage probability.
Impact analysis of FMD's monitoring coverage probability on DRAS
Assuming that the false alarm probability is Pðt HASi7 Þ ¼ Pðt EHASi7 Þ ¼ 0:05, and by simulating the model shown in Fig. 10 , we can determine how the probabilities of the working, hazard, and failure states of the EHAS change with the monitoring coverage probability, as shown in Figs. 11 and 12.
At a given false alarm probability of Pðt HASi7 Þ ¼ Pðt EHASi7 Þ ¼ 0:05, we use the least squares method to fit the numerical data, Fig.11 , and the resulting relationship is given by P A ¼ 0:2869P m þ 0:6384, where P m is monitoring coverage probability and P A is availability of integral DRAS. We can conclude that by improving the monitoring coverage probability by 1%, the availability of DRAS would increase by 0.29%.
In addition, we have applied the least squares method to fit the numerical data in Fig. 12 , and the relationship between the dangerous state probability (P D ) in DRAS and the monitoring coverage probability (P m ) is P D ¼ À0:4158P m þ 0:4172, while the relationship between the failure state probability (P UA ) in DRAS and the monitoring coverage probability is P UA ¼ 0:1289P m À 0:0556. We can conclude that by improving the monitoring coverage probability by 1%, the probability of DRAS's dangerous state would decrease by 0.42%, while the unavailability would increase by 0.13%.
From Figs. 11 and 12 , it can be observed that as the monitoring coverage probability increases, potential faults in the system can be gradually identified and isolated, and the system reliability can be improved. At the same time, since the faults are easier to identify, the possibility of danger from missed detection is substantially reduced, and the failure rate increases.
Impact analysis of FMD's false alarm probability on DRAS
Assuming that the monitoring coverage probability is Pðt HASi5 Þ ¼ Pðt EHASi5 Þ ¼ 0:9, we can determine how the probabilities of the working, dangerous, and failure states of DRAS change with the false alarm probability, as shown in Figs. 13 and 14. Assuming that the monitor coverage probability is Pðt HASi5 Þ ¼ Pðt EHASi5 Þ ¼ 0:9, we can apply the least squares method to fit the numerical data in Fig. 13 . The function in Fig. 13 is P A ¼ À0:3526P fa þ 0:9130. P fa is the false alarm probability and P A is the availability of integral DRAS. We can observe that 1% degradation of the false alarm probability increases the availability of DRAS by 0.35%.
From Fig. 14 , the relationship between the failure state probability (P UA ) of DRAS and the false alarm probability (P fa ) can be described as P UA ¼ 0:3290P fa þ 0:0436, and the relationship between the dangerous state probability (P D ) and the false alarm probability is P D ¼ 0:0239P fa þ 0:0434. We can observe that 1% degradation in the false alarm probability decreases the unreliability of DRAS by 0.33% and the probability of a dangerous state of DRAS would decrease by 0.02%.
It is observed from Figs. 13 and 14 that as the false alarm probability is increasing, the misjudgment rate in the working state increases, hence the components cannot be fully used within a life span, so the reliability drops and the failure rate increases. Alternately, the probability of states M 25 and M 26 will increase as the false alarm probability increases, thus further leading to a rising possibility of the hazard state.
Conclusions
This paper has established a reliability model with GSPN based on the analysis of DRAS architecture and its characteristics. Fig. 12 Relationship between the dangerous state probability, the failure state probability, and the monitoring coverage probability. Fig. 13 Relationship between the working state probability and the false alarm probability. Fig. 14 Relationship between the dangerous state probability, the failure state probability, and the false alarm probability.
The paper has presented a study of different system states and transition relations, and discussed the impacts of the monitoring coverage rate and the false alarm rate of failure monitoring devices on system reliability. The major findings are as follows:
(1) The explicit performance degrading processes and fault sequences as well as different redundancy monitoring transition strategies and potential faults have significant effects on DRAS. Reliability modeling for DRAS based on GSPN can clearly describe the dynamic redundancy degradation and state transitions process. (2) The dissimilar redundant working mode can greatly improve the availability of a large aircraft actuation system compared to a single HAS. In a dissimilar redundancy actuation system, HS/ES and HA/EHA make DRAS experience significant redundancy and performance degradation processes between normal and fault states. The dissimilar system architecture and redundancy transition strategies give better understanding of the reliability advantages of DRAS. (3) Due to the limitations of FMD in DRAS, there are circumstances when system failure cannot be accurately detected or a well-functioning system is reported with false alarms. If a fault is not detected, the system will be in a potentially hazardous situation. In the DRAS reliability model, as presented, an increase of the monitoring coverage rate and a reduction of the false alarm rate would reduce the probability for the system entering a dangerous state.
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that focusing only on redundancy when designing a redundant system is not sufficient and more attention should be paid to improving the failure monitoring devices and designing improved failure monitoring plans. However, this means an increase in the cost of design, so in system design, all comprehensive factors should be taken into account and reasonable design parameters should be selected.
Therefore, when designing a redundancy system, caution should be taken when designing and testing FMD performance. The GSPN model set up in this paper can serve as an accurate reliability assessment for an airplane DRAS, and can also be readily applied in reliability modeling and analysis for other electromechanical systems.
